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2.1  Introduction 
Japan and the United States are two major sources of technological innova- 
tion in the world economy. These two countries employ the largest number 
of research scientists and engineers among the OECD nations and are major 
patenters of  innovations  throughout the world  (see, e.g., Eaton and  Kortum 
1994). The dissemination of  this  innovation  around the world takes several 
forms. One is through  the export of  new products or of  existing products at 
lower cost. Another is through direct foreign investment (DFI). 
Our purpose here is to examine the roles of Japanese and U.S. exports and 
DFI as conduits of  new technology. We  first develop a theoretical model of 
technology diffusion in which one country, the source of innovation, develops 
new inputs into the production process at a regular rate. A fraction of  these 
innovations are potentially useful in another country, which we call the destina- 
tion. When these ideas are potentially useful, the innovating firm can introduce 
them into the destination country either by producing them at home and ex- 
porting them there or by investing in the destination country to produce them 
locally. We compare the desirability of these alternatives. Our model identifies 
country characteristics that determine the extent to which innovators will use 
one method or the other to take advantage of their ideas abroad. 
The analysis has several implications for the relationship between export 
and DFI levels, on the one hand, and characteristics of the destination country, 
on the other. One is that innovators will tend to exploit new ideas in smaller 
countries relatively more by exporting there, and in larger countries through 
DFI. For many parameter values our model implies that DFI will be most sig- 
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nificant for middle-income destination countries: At low levels of income mar- 
ket size is too small to support much DFI, while high wages in high-income 
countries deter it. Factors that reduce the fixed cost of DFI, such as a high level 
of education, obviously encourage it, while factors that raise the opportunity 
cost of labor, such as a high natural resource endowment, discourage it. 
Our model implies that bilateral trade and investment flows can be captured 
by a modified “gravity model” that relates exports and DFI to destination coun- 
try characteristics reflecting market size, the cost of direct investment, the level 
of development, and transportation costs. In the second part of our analysis we 
estimate such a model for annual Japanese and U.S. exports and outward DFI 
to a panel of 72 and 76 countries, respectively,  during the period  1985-90. 
Our aim is to identify the characteristics  of a country  that are significant in 
determining how much Japan and the United States export and invest there.’ 
Several implications of the theoretical model find empirical support in the 
export and DFI patterns  of  both  countries:  First, distance,  as a measure  of 
transport costs,  inhibits trade much more than it inhibits DFI. The negative 
effect of  distance on trade exceeds that on DFI for both countries.  Second, 
market size, as measured by population, favors DFI relative to investment: pop- 
ulation elasticities for both Japanese and U.S. exports and DFI are less than 
one but closer to one for DFI than for exports. Third, a high level of human 
capital, which we interpret as indicative of lower overhead investment costs, is 
associated with a larger DFI position (although human capital also has a posi- 
tive, but less substantial, effect on exports from both countries as well). 
While these results are common to both Japanese and U.S. trade and invest- 
ment patterns, others are not. The prediction that the importance of DFI rela- 
tive to exports peaks for middle-income countries is satisfied by the United 
States but not by Japan. While population  density, which we interpret as im- 
plying lower labor costs, is associated with more DFI from the United States, 
it brings in less from Japan. A possible explanation is that much Japanese DFI 
occurs to exploit  natural  resources  that  are processed  for export  to Japan 
(a possibility not captured by our theoretical model). 
We estimate the model both with and without regional effects. Except for the 
role of distance, the basic implications are not very sensitive to the inclusion of 
I. Learner (1984) is the standard reference on the empirical implementation of  factor endow- 
ments theory to trade flows. Helpman (1987) applies a model of  imperfect competition and scale 
economies to the estimation of  trade flows. Our analysis here combines elements of  these two 
approaches. Less work has been done on the empirical specification of investment flows. Mundell 
(1957), Purvis (1972), and Markusen (1983) model the relationship between trade and investment 
flows. Helpman (1984) and Markusen (1984) provide models of DFI. The analysis here builds on 
earlier empirical work of Eaton and Tamura (1994),who  analyze regional patterns of Japanese and 
U.S. trade and investment flows. The current paper develops a theoretical framework for modeling 
trade and investment flows as well as pursuing an empirical analysis. Moreover, different issues 
are considered. In particular, here we examine the role of  distance and of potential nonlinearitics 
in the relationship between trade and investment, on the one hand, and the level of development, 
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regional effects. We  do not undertake a lengthy discussion of regional trade 
and investment patterns here, which was the purpose  of Eaton  and Tamura 
(1994). One finding that is worth reporting, however, is that, correcting for 
distance  and  other national  features, Japan  imports  more from  the  United 
States than does any other region of the world except East Asia. 
We  present  our theoretical  framework in section 2.2. Section 2.3 reports 
our results on Japanese and U.S. exports and DFI positions. We offer some 
conclusions in section 2.4. 
2.2  A Model of Trade, Investment, and Growth 
Our theoretical  model focuses on two countries. One, which we call the 
source, constantly generates innovations for production. The other, the destina- 
tion, eventually adopts these innovations, but with a lag. The number n of inno- 
vations available in the source summarizes the state of technology there, while 
the size of the subset rn of these innovations available to the destination sum- 
marizes its state of technology. We first describe the equilibrium at any moment 
when m and n are given and then turn to what happens as rn  and n grow over 
time. 
2.2.1  The Static Equilibrium 
At any moment the source country can produce a homogeneous, costlessly 
tradable final output (which serves as numeraire) with a variety of n intermedi- 
ate inputs according to the standard Dixit-Stiglitz  (Dixit and Stiglitz 1977) 
production relationship: 
Q = (jo”xydi)”’,  p E (0,1). 
Here Q represents final output and xi denotes the amount of input i.  The implied 
cost of producing an amount Q is 
where pi is the price of  input i. The destination has the technology to use a 
subset m of  these inputs to produce the same final output. Intermediates are 
produced with one unit of labor in either country. 
The technology to produce each intermediate i is owned by  a firm in the 
source, which takes the wages in each country, ws  and wd in the source and 
destination, respectively, as given, as well as the prices charged by other input 
producers in either country. Inputs can be exported, but exporting one unit of 
any input requires the use of  T workers in the exporting country. Owners of 
individual input technologies face the decision of where to produce. Inputs in 54  Jonathan Eaton and Akiko Tamura 
principle can be produced in each market for local production or in one market 
to service both (or through some combination of the two). To make the analysis 
less taxonomic we will assume that exporting inputs from country d to country 
s is so costly that it is unprofitable.  (As the reader will see, even with simple 
assumptions things get complicated.) Hence the n -  rn inputs that have not 
been absorbed into the destination’s technology are solely produced in country 
s for use in s. Owners of the rn inputs common to both countries must decide 
whether to serve the destination market  by  exporting there or by  producing 
there. Exporting a unit requires T country-s workers, while producing in coun- 
try d at all requires employing F country-d overhead workers on an ongoing 
basis. 
Since producers of all inputs, whether they export or produce locally, set the 
prices of their individual inputs taking all other input prices as given, to max- 
imize profit individual producers will charge a markup l/p over marginal cost. 
Hence producers selling in the local market of the source country will always 
set a price p, = w,/p, while those exporting to country d will set a cif.  price 
px = wJ 1 + ~)/p  and those producing locally in country d will charge pL,  = 
WJP. 
The Source 
Since the  source produces  all  of  its  own  inputs,  we  can take  care  of  it 
quickly. From the cost function implied by the production function, zero profits 
in the production of  the final (numeraire) good require that p, = nil-p)’p  or a 
wage in the source country of 
(1)  w = pnl I  IJ)/IJ. 
I 
Hence as n grows, allowing for greater division of labor in country s,  so does 
the wage there. 
The Destination 
In the destination country, however, there are two potential sources of input 
supply, so that things are more complicated. 
Denote by XD the fraction of the rn inputs that have been absorbed into coun- 
try d’s technology that producers choose to produce in country d (so that the 
remaining 1 -  AD are exported from country s). The cost of producing a unit 
of final output in country d is then 
cD = {rn[(l -  X’)ux  + XDuD]}‘p-’)/p, 
where ux = p$(~-l)  = (1 + T)l”ip-’)/n  and uD = p$-”. For country d to com- 
Pete in the world market for the final good requires that local production  be 
competitive, or that 
(2)  1 = C,  = {m[(l -  XD)uX  + XD~D]}ip~’~’~. 55  Japanese and US.  Exports and Investment as Conduits of Growth 
In order for any domestic production of inputs to occur it must be the case that 
the marginal cost of producing locally is less than that of importing (since the 
first requires a fixed cost while the  second does not). Thus uD > ux. Hence 
the zero-profitability condition (2) implies a negative relationship between  AD 
and u,. 
The profit earned from producing an input in country d is 
T, = (1 -  p){m[(l -  AD)uX  + ADu,])-’/~uDQd  -  wdE 
where  Q,  is the amount of the final good produced in country d, while the 
profit earned from exporting to country d is 
rX  = (1 -  p)(m[(l -  AD)ux + ADuD]}-15xQd. 
For A,  E (O,l), then, requires that nX  = T,  or, incorporating the zero profit- 
ability of final production condition (2),  that 
(3) 
If the left-hand side of equation (3)  exceeds the right, then A,  = 1, while if the 
right-hand side exceeds the left, then A,  = 0. 
If there are L, workers available to direct foreign investors in country d, then 
L, -  ADmF  of them will be available for final production of inputs. These will 
divide themselves evenly  among  the  ADm inputs  that  are locally  produced. 
Hence the amount of each locally produced input will be xD = L,/(ADm) -  E 
The production of final output in country d is therefore 
(4) 
Hence equation (1) determines w,  and (hence p, = w,/p,  px  = ws(  1 + T)/P, 
and ux =  &(P-l))  as a function of n, the state of technology in country s, as 
well as the production parameter p and the transport cost T. Equations (2),  (3), 
and (4) then determine the wage in country d, w,  (and thus pD  and u,),  the 
fraction of  inputs produced in country d, AD, and output in country d, Qd, as 
functions of the wage in s, the labor force in d, L,,  the number of inputs that 
can be used in d, m, and the production function parameter p and the number 
of overhead workers E 
Solving the four equations, the equilibrium fraction of inputs produced lo- 
cally turns out to be 
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and where u = m/n, the fraction of inputs that country d can use, x = (1 - 
UT’)/UT’,  and T’  = (1 + ~)p’(p-’).  Note that XD increases with the ratio of the 
labor force to the required number of overhead workers W(Fnu)  and with the 
transport cost T and decreases with the fraction of inputs u that country d can 
use. 
2.2.2  Dynamics 
Our concern is with a situation in which the countries grow over time. We 
model this as the process of n and m growing at a common rate g.? Obviously, 
if the number of  overhead workers required to produce a good locally remains 
constant, without any growth in the labor force eventually almost all inputs in 
the destination country will be imported. Since the ratio of the volume of trade 
to output seems to have remained roughly constant over time, even as the divi- 
sion of  labor has increased, technical progress must have occurred in overhead 
as well. To allow for a steady state in which the proportion of trade to produc- 
tion remains constant even as the world economy grows we let the fixed cost 
of DFI fall in proportion as the number of available inputs increases. We also 
want to allow for the possibility that more advanced countries, that is, destina- 
tion countries that are better able to absorb new foreign technologies, might 
also provide overhead services more efficiently. To capture these effects we set 
F = f/(u*n),  where f is a positive constant and p is a (presumably positive) 
parameter capturing the effect of relative productivity on the efficiency with 
which overhead services can be provided. 
Incorporating this expression for F into equation (5)  we get a share of DFI 
(if it is interior) of 
which is independent of the current state of technology n. Under these assump- 
tions output in the two countries will grow at a common rate (1 -  p)g/p, with 
the relative productivity  of  the destination  depending on u. The fraction  of 
inputs produced locally will remain constant over time. 
It remains the case that countries that are larger relative to the fixed cost 
parameter$  and countries that are more expensive to export to, will have rela- 
tively more  investment. Depending on the parameter  IJ., however, the share 
of products produced  locally might rise or fall with the destination’s relative 
productivity as reflected by the ratio u. 
To illustrate what the model implies for the relationship between a country’s 
2. Krugman (1979) provides a growth model in which the steady state has this property. Here, 
as in  Krugman, new products erupt in the source country spontaneously and trickle down to the 
destination. Our model could accommodate an  endogenous R&D process as in  Grossman and 
Helpman (1991), but since our focus is on how technologies are transmitted rather than how they 
are developed we treat innovation as exogenous. 57  Japanese and U.S. Exports and Investment as Conduits of Growth 
ability to absorb technology and how much DFI it attracts relative to exports, 
table 2.1 reports values of AD  and the ratio of exports to output (XlQ)  for values 
of (r between .l and 1 (at intervals of .l).  In our base case, reported in the first 
pair of columns, L/f= 5,  p = .75, p = 0.5, and k = 2.  Our choice of k implies 
that overhead requirements fall more than in proportion to the number of inputs 
that the country can use. The chosen value of p implies an elasticity of substitu- 
tion between inputs of 4 and a markup over the marginal cost of production of 
33 percent. Transport costs are 5 percent of the marginal cost of production in 
the source. Given these other parameter values, our choice of the ratio of the 
fixed cost parameter to the labor force implies a ratio of overhead to production 
workers of between 5 and 10 percent. 
We  also report the implications of  (1)  dropping IJ. to  1  (so that overhead 
requirements in more advanced countries are exactly inversely proportional to 
their ability to adopt inputs),  (2)  dropping  p to .5 (so that the elasticity  of 
substitution between inputs is 2), (3) raising T to .l,  and (4) doubling the la- 
bor force. 
Several things are worth noting in table 2.1: First, doubling the population 
raises the fraction of inputs produced locally, with more effect in richer coun- 
tries. The model thus predicts that DFI will tend to increase more than in pro- 
portion to the destination country’s size while exports will increase in less than 
proportion. At the same time an increase in population acts to reduce the ratio 
of exports to output. Hence the model predicts nonhomogeneity in the relation- 
ship between country size, on the one hand, and exports and DFI, on the other, 
with an increase in country size leading to a less than proportional increase in 
exports but a more than proportional increase in DFI. 
Second, the relationship between the destination’s ability to absorb technol- 
ogy and the extent to which source country innovators will exploit their ideas 
through DFI can be nonmonotonic. In all but the case in which IJ. = 1 it is an 
“inverted U” relationship, with the fraction of inputs provided through invest- 
Table 2.1  Simulated DFI and Export Shares 
Base  k’1  p = .5  7  = .1  Uf  = 10 
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ment peaking for middle-income countries. The share of DFI rises between the 
poorest and middle-income countries because the fixed cost falls, but for richer 
countries this effect is overshadowed  by  the higher labor costs in the more 
advanced country. When p = 1 the first effect is inoperative so that only the 
second manifests itself, so that the share of inputs provided through DFI falls 
as u rises. 
Third, despite the nonmonotonicity in the relationship between the fraction 
of  inputs provided through DFI and output, exports tend to rise with u. The 
reason  is  that  as u rises  so does the  wage  and  the  cost  of  production  in 
the destination country relative to the cost of production in the source. Since 
the elasticity of  substitution between inputs exceeds  1, an increased relative 
cost of production and, hence, through the fixed markup, an increased price, 
implies a lower expenditure on the input. Hence a poor country tends to use a 
much larger amount of a domestically produced input, relative to an imported 
input, than a richer country. Notice that when the elasticity of substitution falls 
to 2 the tendency of exports to rise with u is much less pronounced. 
Fourth, doubling transport costs, not surprisingly, reduces exports and raises 
the fraction of inputs produced locally. The effect is greater for richer coun- 
tries. The model predicts, then, that innovators will tend to exploit their ideas 
in more distant countries via DFI and in closer countries through export. 
2.3  Japanese and U.S. Exports and DFI 
We use the model as a basis for examining Japanese and U.S. exports and 
outward  DFI positions with a balanced panel of  72 countries in the case of 
Japan and 76 countries in the case of the United States, using annual data for 
the period 1985-90.  Our model implies that exports to a country and DFI posi- 
tions in that country will be determined by (1) the labor force available for 
employment by  direct foreign investors in that country relative to the cost of 
investing there, (2) the country’s ability to adopt technologies from the source 
country, and (3) the cost of exporting goods there. 
2.3.1  Econometric Specification and Variables 
To capture the effect of the country’s available labor force relative to invest- 
ment costs we relate Japanese and U.S. exports Xt,  and outward DFI 0,,  at time 
t to partner i’s  population POP,,. Our model implies that exports and DFI are 
potentially nonhomogeneous in size. Hence we introduce a specification that 
allows for nonhomogeneity. We capture the effect of a country’s ability to ab- 
sorb technology from the source through income per capita YPCj,. Since our 
model implies that the effect of u on the relative importance of DFI and exports 
might be nonmonotonic, we introduce both a linear and quadratic measure of 
income per capita. Also, the ability of a country to make use of Japanese and 
U.S. ideas might depend on its factor endowments. We use the destination’s 
population density DEN,, as an inverse measure of natural resource endow- 59  Japanese and U.S. Exports and Investment as Conduits of Growth 
ments and a measure of the average years of schooling per worker HK, to cap- 
ture human capitaL3 Finally we use distance d,  from Japan or the United States 
to capture transport  Different regions of the world might have unob- 
served characteristics (such as different policies toward imports and DFI) other 
than those which we have taken into account. Hence in one set of estimates we 
include dummy variables for the region of the destination country 6,  (assigned 
as indicated in the appendix, table 2A.  1). We also include dummy variables to 
take into account systematic effects of time 6, 
As the subscripts indicate, we have annual data for the variables POP, YPC, 
and DEN. Our measure of human capital, taken from Kyriacou (199  l), is avail- 
able only  at five-year intervals. Hence we use the measure for 1985 for all 
years.’ Table 2A.3 in the appendix indicates sources of data. 
Our specification embodies elements of both the standard gravity and factor 
endowments specifications of trade patterns extended to explain DFI positions 
as well as trade  flows.6 In  contrast  to these approaches,  our model  implies 
potential nonhomogeneity  in the relationship between our dependent and ex- 
planatory variables. To accommodate these, we assume that for each dependent 
variable V(  V = X, 0),  the explanatory variables are linear homogeneous in a, 
+ y,, where a, is a threshold parameter that we estimate. A positive value of 
a, implies that the function  of  the explanatory  variables explaining  V must 
achieve a minimum threshold value before strictly positive values of  V occur. 
A negative value of a, means that a minimum level of  V occurs independently 
of the explanatory variables. 
For Japan and the United States separately, then, we estimate the equations: 
for V = X,O. Here uWl  is a normal error term associated with dependent vari- 
able V and 6,  is the column vector of coefficients of dummy variables for time 
and 6,  is the column vector of dummy variables for region. For each depen- 
3. These measures also might reflect aspects of labor force availability relative to the cost of 
investment. A high level of human capital might, other things equal, reduce the cost of overhead, 
while a high natural resource endowment might reduce the labor force available for producing in 
the manufacturing sector (to which our model is more appropriate). 
4. Distances are between major cities. Table 2A.2 reports the cities chosen and the distances 
between them for the cities in our sample. Distance might also raise the overhead requirement 
for DFI. 
5.  Kyriacou (1991) constructs a measure of the average level of human capital from official data 
on schooling using a perpetual  inventory method. We thank Mark Spiegel for making the data 
available to us. 
6. Deardorff (1984) discusses the “gravity” approach to modeling trade flows econometrically. 
It has its origins in the work of Tinbergen (1962) and Poyhonen (1963). The framework has re- 
cently been  applied to regional trade issues by  Frankel and Wei  (1993). Drysdale and Gamaut 
(1982) provide a very thorough survey of  the approach. Learner (1974), as we do here, estimates 
a model that encompasses the factor endowments and gravity approaches. 60  Jonathan Eaton and Akiko Tamura 
dent variable  V we estimate the intercept a,,  the constant C,,  the population 
coefficient a,,  the per capita income coefficients p,  and p", the density coeffi- 
cient y,,  the human  capital coefficient  C,, and the distance coefficient  q,. 
Note that we allow for a nonconstant elasticity of income per capita. 
We estimate the equations by maximum likelihood. To derive the maximum 
likelihood function we rearrange this relationship and take natural logarithms 
of each side to obtain 
In(a,  + V,,) = C, + a, In  POP,  + p,  In  YPC,, 
The density function for V,, is 
We assume that uir -  N(0,  u2).  Hence, 
and the log-likelihood function is 
In L(vZ';B,,a,)  = 
[In (V,, + a,) -  Z3J,I2  .  I 
1  1 
-In  (V,, + a") --(In  21-r + In u2) --- 
2  2u2 
The maximum likelihood estimates of a, and 0, maximize In  L(vZ';O,,av). 
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 report the estimated equations for Japan and the United 
States, respectively. The numbers in parentheses below the estimated coeffi- 
cients  are  Eicker-White  standard  errors  (see White  1982). Defining  ~-r, = 
{  0,.  a,}  as the vector of parameters, these are the square roots of the diagonal 
elements of the matrix 
Var (T,)  = A-'(T,)B(T,)A-'(I-~,), 
where 61  Japanese and US. Exports and Investment as Conduits of Growth 
Table 2.2  Japan: Trade and Investment Equations (maximum likelihood, 
Tobit estimates) 
Variable 
V = Export  V = DFI Out 



























































































































Equation: In (a + V) = max [Z'b + u,  In a]. 
Nores: Numbers in parentheses are Eicker-White standard errors. Time dummies (DTI-DT5)  are 
included in all regressions. Z'  =  { C, constant; POP,  population; YPC, per capita GNP DEN, 
density; HK, human capital; JDIST, distance from Japan; DRI-DR8,  region dummies]. 
Because  of  the intercepts  a,,  the coefficients av,  pv,  p,  y,,  E,,  and -qv 
converge only asymptotically to the elasticity of  the dependent variable with 
respect to the corresponding independent variable as the independent variable 
approaches  infinity. Table 2.4 reports the actual elasticities calculated  at the 
mean values of the dependent variables. Table 2.3  United States: 'kade and Investment Equations (maximum 
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V = Export  V = DFI Out 
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Equation: In (a + V)  = max [Z'b + u, In a] 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are Eicker-White standard errors. Time dummies (DT  I-DT5)  are 
included in  all regressions. Z'  = [ C,  constant: POP,  population; YPC, per capita GNP; DEN, 
density;  HK.  human  capital; UDIST,  distance  from United  States:  DR1-DR8,  DRIO,  region 
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Table 2.4  'Ikade and Investment Elasticities 
~~  ___ 
With Region Dummies  Without Region Dummies 
Export  DFI Out  Export  DFI Out 
Japan 
Population 







Income per worker 
Density 
Human capital 









































2.3.2  Results 
and distance in turn. 
We  discuss effects of  population, per capita income, factor endowments, 
Population 
Consistent with the theory we find that population has a nonhomogeneous 
effect both on exports and DFI. Moreover, consistent with the model we find 
that the population elasticity for imports tends to be lower than that for DFI, 
so that large countries do tend to receive more DFI than exports compared with 
small countries. While our estimates of population elasticities for exports are 
less than 1, as our theory would predict, they are also less than 1 for DFI, in 
contrast with what our theoretical model predicted. The results thus suggest 
that larger countries are more closed overall than smaller countries, but rela- 
tively less closed to DFI than to exports. 
Per Capita Income 
The U.S. results confirm the model's prediction of  an elasticity of exports 
with respect to the level of  development above 1. The elasticity for Japan is 
very close to  1, however. Our estimates imply that increases in relative per 
capita income increase DFI at an accelerating rate. The effect on exports dif- 
fers between the Japan and the United States, however. The effect of income 
per capita on imports from Japan also tends to accelerate, while its effect on 
imports from the United States is sensitive to the inclusion of region dummies. 
Figures 2.1A and 2.1B illustrate (for Japan) and 2.U and 2.2B (for the United 
States) the effects of increases in the destination country's income per capita 64  Jonathan Eaton and Akiko Tamura 
on DFI and exports from the two countries, with and without the inclusion of 
regional  dummies. A rough impression is that, for Japan, exports tend to re- 
place DFI as income grows, with the opposite the case for the United States. 
This result suggests that Japan’s cost of DFI tends to be relatively lower in poor 
countries compared with the United States. 
Factor Endowments 
We find that increased density acts to increase exports from both countries. 
An explanation is that, given per capita income, countries with less in the way 
of natural resources absorb more technology from the two countries and hence 
import more. We find less tendency for more densely populated countries to 
absorb more DFI. In the case of Japanese DFI the relationship is negative. One 
explanation, not accounted for in our theoretical model, is that some Japanese 
DFI is undertaken to exploit natural resources. 
Increases in human capital have a significant effect on both exports and DFI 
from both countries, suggesting that once other factors are taken into account, 
countries with more human capital tend to absorb more technology from Japan 
and the United States. Moreover, the elasticity with respect to DFI is much 
larger than with respect to exports. A plausible explanation consistent with our 
model is that a high level of human capital reduces the fixed cost of undertak- 
ing DFI. 
Distance 
The effects of  distance on exports and DFI, unlike the effects of  most of 
our other explanatory variables, are quite sensitive to the inclusion of regional 
effects. This sensitivity is not surprising given the multicolinearity between the 
two. We find, however, that distance always has an inhibiting effect on exports 
(as a standard gravity specification would predict). Moreover, as our model 
would predict, distance reduces trade more than it reduces DFI. Except for the 
case of Japan, when regional dummies are included, we find that distance also 
tends to inhibit DFI, but by less than it inhibits exports. Hence Japan and the 
United States tend  to trade relatively  more close by  and to invest relatively 
more far away.’ 
Regional Effects 
Eaton and Tamura (1994)  discuss the regional concentration of Japanese and 
U.S. trade and DFI patterns. This earlier work did not include distance as a 
separate explanatory variable, incorporating the effect of distance through the 
regional effects. A primary finding there was that, correcting for size, per cap- 
ita income, and  factor  endowments,  Japan imported  more from the United 
7. Brainard (1993a. 1993b)  provides evidence on the role of  distance in trade and DFI decisions 
from firm-level data. She also finds a tendency for firms to rely more on domestic production than 
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Fig. 2.1  Japan regression: export and DFI out (A) with region dummies and 
(B)  without region dummies 
States than the typical country in Western Europe. Our results here strengthen 
this finding  significantly. We  find that,  once distance as well as these other 
factors are taken into account, Japan imports more from the United States than 
any other region  except  East Asia,  including  not  only Western  Europe but 
North and Central America as well. We still find Japan to be more closed than 
Western Europe to U.S. DFl, but only slightly so. We  also continue to find 
Oceania and East Asia to be highly open to both exports and DFI from both 
countries. 
2.4  Conclusion 
Japan and the United States are not only the two largest economies in the 
world; measures of research activity and patenting indicate that they are also 66  Jonathan Eaton and Akiko Tamura 
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without region dummies 
the two largest sources of technological innovation in the world. Exports and 
DFI are two major conduits for transferring technology abroad. 
In this paper we have developed a simple model for the decision whether to 
exploit a technology abroad via export or via DFI. The model points to country 
size, technological sophistication, and distance as important factors. Moreover, 
it suggests that the effects of these variables may be not only nonhomogeneous 
but nonmonotonic as well. 
We  use the model  as a basis for specifying a model  of Japanese and U.S. 
export and DFI patterns around the world. The implications of  some but not 
all aspects of the model are confirmed. We do find, for example, that the impor- 
tance of DFI relative to exports tends to grow with country size, but that DFI 
as well as exports tend to increase less than in proportion to country size while 
our model predicts that DFI should increase more than in proportion. Consis- 67  Japanese and U.S. Exports and Investment as Conduits of Growth 
tent with our model we also find that distance tends to inhibit DFI much less 
than it inhibits exports. Both Japan and the United States tend to export rela- 
tively more close by and to invest relatively more far away. The model predicts 
that the relationship between exports and DFI, on the one hand, and a country’s 
ability to absorb technology, on the other, can be very nonmonotonic. We find 
some tendency for Japanese exports to rise relative to DFI as countries become 
more advanced, with U.S. exports and DFI exhibiting the opposite tendency. 
A striking finding, reinforcing a major result in Eaton and Tamura (1994), 
is that Japan is relatively open to U.S. exports compared with other regions of 
the world, taking into account size, income, and factor endowments. Here we 
find that taking distance into account sharply accentuates this result: once dis- 
tance as well as these other factors are corrected for Japan is more open to US. 
exports than any region except East Asia. 
Our empirical work has focused very narrowly on exports and DFI, taking 
the background of innovation and diffusion as given. A task for future research 
is the integration of the issues considered here with an analysis of the factors 
determining the rate of  innovation in the world economy. 
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Note: Sample(s) in which country is included given in parentheses. 
Table 2A.2  Distance Data in the Sample 








































































6,438 Table 2A.2  (continued) 





























































































































































































(continued) Table 2A.2  (continued) 

































































"Distance  from Japan (Tokyo) in kilometers. 
bDistance from United States (Chicago) in kilometers 
Table 2A.3  Data Sources 






GDP per capita 
Surface area 
Human capital 
Distance (from Tokyo; from Chicago) 
Direction of  Trade Statistics  Yearbook (Washington, 
D.C.: International Monetary Fund, various issues) 
Zaisei-Kinyu Tokei Geppou (FiscaVFinancial Statistics 
Monthly) (Tokyo: Ministry of Finance, various 
issues) 
Survev of  Current Business (Washington, D.C.: 
Department of Commerce, various issues) 
Penn World Table (Mark 5.6) (see Summers and Heston 
1991) 
Penn World Table (Mark 5.6) (see Summers and Heston 
1991) 
Staristical Yearbook (New York: Statistical Office 
United Nations, various issues) 
Kyriacou (1991) 
Software Toolworks World Atlas v. 5.0 (The Software 
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Comment  Chong-Hyun Nam 
This is an excellent piece of empirical work. The empirical part of the paper 
relies on a rich set of data, and estimation results by and large confirm com- 
monsense expectations. The highlight is Eaton and Tamura’s confirmation that 
country characteristics such as population, income level, land abundance, hu- 
man capital, and locational distance are all important determinants not only of 
bilateral trade flows but also of bilateral direct foreign investment. The paper 
also develops a simple model to determine whether a country will grow as a 
capital importer or exporter. I have only a couple of  short comments on the 
paper:  one concerns  the  structure of  the estimated equations,  and the other 
concerns interpretation of some estimation results. 
First, I felt that it would have been  very useful  if  Eaton and Tamura had 
explained  at  the  outset  why  the estimation  equations were  constructed  as 
shown in the paper and, in particular, why the same structural equation could 
be used for explaining both bilateral trade flows and bilateral direct foreign 
investment flows. 
In estimating bilateral trade flows, the paper seems to have included most of 
the important  explanatory  variables, but  they may not be sufficient. For in- 
stance, it seems that some price variables, such as exchange rates, and some 
protection measures may also work as good explanatory variables for bilateral 
trade flows. 
As for bilateral direct foreign investment flows, still more explanatory vari- 
ables may be conceivable, depending on the purpose of direct foreign invest- 
ment. For instance,  Korea’s outbound direct foreign investment is often  in- 
tended to take advantage of wage rate differentials, to circumvent protection 
measures,  or to develop and  secure a stable  supply of  raw materials.  So, it 
may be  worthwhile to examine some variables  or proxies  corresponding  to 
these purposes. 
Second, the elasticity of export or import with respect to a country’s popula- 
tion size was estimated to be significantly less than 1. Eaton and Tamura con- 
jecture that  this is so because large countries  tend to be more protectionist 
than small countries. They further argue that if this conjecture is correct, an 
implication is that the formation of a trading bloc would mean less trade be- 
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tween the member countries in the bloc collectively  and Japan or the United 
States. 
I am not convinced by this line of argument. First, I do not find any strong 
a priori reasons to believe large countries would tend to be more protectionist 
than small countries, or vice versa. Instead, the low trade elasticity with respect 
to country size could be more due to the fact that largeness in economic size 
allows greater exploitation of scale economies in production and a greater de- 
gree of economies of scope in products which leads to lower trade elasticity. I 
also think that the mere formation of a trading bloc would not necessarily re- 
duce trade between the bloc and another country outside the bloc, unless the 
member countries of  the bloc become more protectionistic against outsiders 
than before the bloc was formed. 
Comment  V.  V.  Bhanoji Rao 
Eaton and Tamura’s paper is very rich in statistical results. However, it appears 
to be somewhat unfinished because in many instances there is insufficient in- 
terpretation and explanation, as my comments below will indicate. I follow the 
headings in section 2.3 of the Eaton-Tamura paper for my comments. 
Econometric Specification and Variables 
To explain the bilateral trade and investment of Japan and the United States 
with a number of countries in the Asia-Pacific region, the variables used are: 
population  of  the  country,  per  capita  income,  population  density,  years  of 
schooling of an average worker, distance between Japan or the United States 
and the country, and time dummies. The selection of variables takes into ac- 
count gravity models and factor intensity explanations of trade flows. One can- 
not but agree with the selection of variables in regard to explaining trade flows. 
The paper, however, lacks a discussion of the applicability of these variables 
to investment flows. Such a discussion would greatly improve the authority and 
authenticity of the paper. 
Factor endowments are proxied  by  per  capita income  (proxy for capital- 
labor ratio), population density (proxy for labor-land  ratio), and the average 
years of schooling of the labor force (human capital). Since the last variable, 
in fact, refers to the quality of the labor force, we have here capital intensity, 
land intensity, and quality intensity of labor. Is there some anomaly here? What 
is the rationale for this special treatment of labor? An explanation is needed. 
As for the methodology, it would be useful to provide a short explanatory 
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statement on why the maximum  likelihood method  is preferred to standard 
regression analysis. 
Results 
Population. Trade elasticities with respect  to population are less than  unity 
indicating that small countries are relatively more and large countries relatively 
less trade  oriented. According to the authors, “The results  thus  suggest that 
larger countries are more closed overall than smaller countries.” A more im- 
portant explanation may be that large countries, by virtue of their market size, 
find that a wide variety of enterprises are viable in catering to domestic de- 
mands. This is the case of natural import substitution that goes on all the time. 
Furthermore, in the case of commodities where the large countries in the re- 
gion may have a comparative advantage (e.g., rice, sugar, and textiles), it may 
be that protectionism in Japan and the United States is the real factor behind 
the relatively low trade elasticities. The authors should build into their explana- 
tion all the plausible factors rather than limit themselves to just one. 
Eaton and Tamura also found that the larger countries tend to have relatively 
lower per  capita  direct  foreign  investment  (DFI)  from  either Japan  or the 
United States. This is also explained by the suggestion that large countries are 
more closed than small countries. The authors should recognize that in some 
instances, protectionism may lead to greater DFI to tap the domestic markets 
(e.g., the automobile sector in Indonesia), although this is not what is implied 
by their results. The authors should also examine more closely whether popula- 
tion size matters at all in regard to per capita DFI flows. 
Per capita income. With reference to per capita income, Japan’s export elastici- 
ties are slightly higher than the U.S. elasticities. Both countries, however, have 
either unitary or higher than unitary elasticities. DFI elasticities have the same 
pattern  as the export elasticities. On the  import side, Japan’s elasticities are 
lower than the US. elasticities and somewhat lower than unity. Interpreting 
these patterns, the authors note that Japan buys more from poor countries and 
sells more to rich countries. In regard to DFI elasticities, which are close to 1 
or greater than 1, the differences between Japan and the United States are rela- 
tively less pronounced, though Japan’s DFI elasticities are slightly higher than 
the U.S. elasticities. Japan, thus, tends to invest more in and export more to 
countries with relatively higher per capita purchasing power. Could it be be- 
cause foreign policy and human rights considerations play a relatively larger 
role in US. trade and investment policies? There is a need to probe into and 
explain the patterns of the elasticities and expand the discussion. 
Factor endowments. The authors’ finding is that land-scarce Japan tends  to 
import significantly less from high-density countries, while the land-abundant 
United  States tends  to import more from such countries. This finding  is in 75  Japanese and U.S. Exports and Investment as Conduits of Growth 
accordance with a priori expectations. Both the United States and Japan, how- 
ever, tend to export to countries with greater population densities. This finding 
has been left unexplained. 
The authors note that  a high level of  education in a country significantly 
reduces Japan’s involvement in  any form with that country. This finding too 
requires some explanation. 
Distance. The findings  confirm  that  distance  inhibits trade.  The interesting 
findings, however, are that U.S. trade is more inhibited by distance than Japan’s 
and that distance also inhibits U.S. DFI, but not Japanese DFI. Could it be that 
the  findings  are evidence of  the Japanese drive for markets and investment 
outlets in contrast to the historical  U.S. drive to promote political and other 
noneconomic interests? The paper should add a brief explanatory statement. 
Concluding Observation 
The Eaton-Tamura paper in its present form remains a statistical exercise on 
the determinants of the trading and investment relationships of Japan and the 
United States individually with a group of countries. The paper’s use and sig- 
nificance would have been greatly enhanced if the authors had interpreted and 
explained the results and drawn useful policy conclusions, if any. 